
At
last, Bill Clinton has a legacy beyond impeachment and contempt of court.
He has re-ignited the Cold War. He provoked Boris Yeltsin to warn NATO
and the United States: "don’t push us toward military action. Otherwise
there will be a European war for sure, and possibly a world war." Fortunately,
he added, "We are against this;" but he also said: "they want to use
ground troops, take over Yugoslavia, make it their protectorate. We
cannot allow this. Russia and access to the Mediterranean Sea are nearby,
so we can by no means give Yugoslavia away."
These are strong words for a man who used to consider himself a friend
of the United States, and vice versa. President Clinton has been on
the verge of losing a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to win Russia to
the West.
Today, it is worse than a missed opportunity. The bombing of Yugoslavia
is a direct provocation. The rift is the result of incredible blundering
on the part of the Clinton foreign policy team. The Washington Post
cited aides of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright who admitted that
she expected Slobodan Milosevic to back down like a "schoolyard bully"
after a few punches were thrown, and that Mr. Clinton agreed —ignoring
the advice of the military and central intelligence. For once in his
protected life, Bill Clinton ran across a serious (if deeply flawed)
man and he is now paying the price of assuming everyone is as mushy
as he.
Mr. Yeltsin, the man who stood against tanks, is someone else not to
be taken lightly.
But it is more than a blundering administration. The whole idea of transforming
a Milosevic who had already lost four of seven of his former provinces
into a Hitler who dominated Europe was cockeyed from the beginning.
The Serbian leader was afraid to provoke NATO too much in a "sacred"
Kosovo he could not afford to give up without losing power, until he
had nothing to lose with the bombs falling. Before, he fought units
of the Kosovo Liberation Army and hundreds of civilians supposedly helping
them; after, it was hundreds of thousands of innocent refugees. Ignoring
the larger humanitarian problems in other world troublespots, there
is now support for committing American ground troops from most of the
welfare internationalists on the left.
Many on the right support it too, claiming U.S. vital interests are
involved in maintaining stability in the region, and because we must
support our NATO allies. With all due respect, these are reasons for
opposition to ground troops rather than the reverse.
Look at the region. The whole Orthodox Christian cultural world has
turned from U.S. fans to antagonists because of the bombing alone, becoming
especially incensed that it was maintained through Easter. Invasion
would be worse. Neighboring Bulgaria recently applied to join NATO and
its leaders apparently still want to. But its population is livid, even
supporting a Vassil Levski Legion that recruited 8,342 military volunteers
in Moscow.
Macedonia has notified NATO that its territory cannot be used for a
military strike against Kosovo. The bombing has rallied the Serbian
democratic opposition to Mr. Milosevic’s side and has alienated reformist
Montenegro from the West. There pretty much goes the whole neighborhood.
What the bombing is doing to NATO is even worse because it weakens the
alliance itself. Neighboring Hungary has refused the use of its territory
for NATO ground troops because Northern Serbia is populated by its ethnic
brothers, and it has bowed to Russian threats to allow passage of supplies
to Serbia. The Czech Republic opposed sending its ground troops to attack
fellow Slavs. Italy has been critical of deeper involvement.
Even relations with France have been frayed, with The Washington Times
quoting a "senior Western military source" that "Washington has started
cutting Paris out of the loop on some [NATO] operations because of the
worry of information being handled either to the Serbs directly or indirectly
through the Russians." NATO member Greece has had pretty much continuous
rallies against the bombing, one with 60,000 protestors, and will cut
bait soon. Germany is wavering.
The fact is, the Kosovo operation is dividing NATO and this is the best
reason to settle it. The hard-liners say, intimidate the weak Europeans
but, if they oppose troops in their own backyard, how vital can the
interests be? One of the essential requirements for committing troops
by the "vital interests" right is that military action must have a reasonable
chance of keeping popular support. Many have touted a Washington Post/ABC
News poll claiming public support is growing for ground troops. Not
only did they ignore two other polls (with different wording) that said
the opposite but that poll itself found: "About half of all Americans
said they are unwilling to lose any American soldiers to bring peace
to Kosovo. Even a third of those who favored sending in ground troops
would reconsider it meant Americans would die."
Republicans were 10 percent less supportive than the general population
and, as the Des Moines Register’s David Jepsen noted, were significantly
less enthusiastic in critical early Iowa.
Ground warfare in which troops do not die does not exist. We have been
offered that siren call before and, in the past, the vital-interests
right has argued against becoming the "world’s defender" and warned
that, while we must support our allies with economic and military assistance,
we cannot substitute our troops or will for theirs. Bill Clinton regularly
ignores this advice and has committed American forces to 61 military
operations, while George Bush did so 20 times in four years. Ronald
Reagan only committed the military to 10 overseas operations in eight
years. When things went wrong, as in Lebanon, he got the troops out.
The worst part about Kosovo is that it threatens other vital American
interests. Russia may be considered "second rate" in some ways but it
is the only nation that can destroy the United States with its 20,000
intercontinental missiles. That is why homeland missile defense is so
important. But there is no shield in place now.
Yugoslavia especially takes attention from hotter trouble spots. Air
forces have been shifted from duty in Iraq. Naval forces have been moved
from Korea. Regarding the latter, it might be well to consider the "advice"
of North Korea’s unofficial spokesman in Tokyo, Kim Myong Chol: "We
sincerely hope that the United States continues attacking [in Yugoslavia]
and sends ground troops so it gets bogged down as it did in Vietnam.
And we hope more of its fighter jets are shot down." The U.S. got bogged
down for years in Korea too, come to think of it, in terrain not unlike
that of Yugoslavia.
Donald
Devine, former director Of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management,
is a columnist and a Washington-based policy consultant and a Vice Chairman
for the American Conservative Union.