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Donald
J. Devine
Machiavelli
and the movable goal posts
August 31, 2001
It
was a mountain rather than an ocean vacation but President Bush drew a
line in the sand anyway, promising to veto congressional spending busting
his budget. All Washington awaits the Fall Battle of the Budget, for it
determines winners and losers on the basis of who gets how much money.
Ronald Reagan was declared the winner by the Democratic speaker of the
House because he cut nondefense spending by 15 percent in 1981-82 (and
again by 2 percent in 1985-86). The first President Bush was a loser with
Congress because nondefense spending rose by 8 percent during his tenure.
That is how pols keep score.
The situation with the current President Bush is complicated by the fact
that his team keeps moving the goal posts. The original Bush budget called
for growth of only 4 percent, the rate Bill Clinton achieved in 1997-98.
But, in order to get additional defense funding in the spring, the president
"stretched" the caps on spending and is now (apparently) seeking a 6 percent
increase in discretionary spending -- about the average of the Clinton
years. Those were tricky years for averaging since spending actually went
down 3 percent after Republicans took control of the House in 1994 and
went up 11 percent the last year when Mr. Clinton and the GOP opened the
spending floodgates to buy votes in the 2000 election.
Even with the moving target, Mr. Bush keeps even nominal spending down
only by predicting a higher rate of growth next year than do the "blue
chip" private sector economists and by "reallocating" $5.6 billion for
2001 from the Social Security surplus to the normal budget, freeing up
$4.3 billion for additional spending. Mr. Bush's opponents think he is
a bit light in the brain department. His ability to thus maneuver, however,
shows he is a politician of no little merit. Mr. Bush, in fact, is as
good a politician as Mr. Clinton -- high praise indeed. He has learned
much from him, even more than from President Reagan, to whom he often
gives credit. Rather, both followed the real politician's handbook, Machiavelli's
"The Prince."
"Leave affairs of reproach to the management of others, and keep those
of grace in [your] own hands." Appear "merciful, faithful, humane, upright
and religious" whether you are or not. Disguise your strengths. Appease
your supporters -- but no more than necessary. Like the fox, blunt the
opposition with a few favors. Like the lion, keep the middle "satisfied
and contented" by generous acts (but fight excessive tax liberality).
Mr. Bush produced for his core supporters by reversing the Clinton abortion
orders and passing a tax cut aimed at his higher-income supporters, although
wisely also spread to the middle. Sending out actual checks in the mail
was truly princely. He blunted the left by opposing racial profiling and,
generally, wooing blacks and Hispanics. He even just ducked his first
chance to oppose racial preference in contracting. He played "nice" for
the middle on education, stem-cell research, faith-based initiatives,
disability loans, drug benefits and welfare. Even his focus upon foreign
policy is from Machiavelli.
On education, he was able to get The Washington Post to say that "Democrats
embraced many of his ideas" and to enlist very liberal San Francisco Rep.
George Miller to lead the charge. Only Republicans expressed dismay at
the additional federal controls, and not too loudly at that. Their one
bone -- vouchers for privately educating those in failing public schools
-- was taken out of the bill. Massachusetts Democratic Sen. Edward M.
Kennedy again joined Mr. Bush, for the fourth time in two weeks, in the
East Room to announce the later's plan to increase by tenfold the funding
for low-interest loans to help average people purchase technology.
When Mr. Bush sent a $48 billion four-year, state-based plan to help poor,
elderly Americans pay for prescription drugs, the White House -- which
did not even hold a briefing promoting the bill beforehand -- immediately
responded that it would compromise with additional spending or with a
larger national program to meet Democratic objections. Even for his "faith
based," private sector welfare initiative, he convinced Connecticut Democratic
Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman and "communitarian" liberals William Galston,
Amitai Etzioni and Robert D. Putnam to support his proposal initially,
while Marvin Olasky -- its original promoter -- finally opposed it as
too compromised by Congress.
By the end of summer, the vast middle liked the compromises, the Republicans
kept quiet and the Democrats got the policy results (except on abortion
and taxes) -- a Machiavellian performance indeed. But Washington reads
the real bottom line, as Machiavelli also taught its leaders. If spending
goes above 6 percent, the fox is found without power and the jackals rule.
Donald
Devine, former director Of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management,
is a columnist and a Washington-based policy consultant and a Vice Chairman
for the
American Conservative Union. |