Donald J. Devine

September 14 , 2005

Katrina Proves Big Government

Talk about taking advantage of a tragedy. Liberals could not contain their glee. Four days after the landfall of Katrina, The Washington Post op-ed had not one but two encomiums to the joys of big government as savior of humanity. The New York and Los Angeles Times had the gall to report it as news.

"When Government Is Good" was E.J. Dionne’s piece, by the man Bill Clinton himself gave credit for being the inspiration for his "New Democrat" politics. He cutely quoted a former Clinton official that "government is the enemy until you need a friend." Such disasters as Katrina present "a time when government is morally obligated to be competent, prepared, innovative, flexible, well-financed -- in short, smart enough and, yes, big enough to undertake an enormous task. How can we look at Katrina’s victims in the eye, say we care and not take account of how their needs should affect the other things government does," such as selfishly cutting taxes or social programs?

The normally sound, if progressive-leaning, David Ignatius, did Dionne one better. While the Clinton favorite at least found voluntary efforts important, if second fiddle to government expertise, Ignatius simply dismissed alternatives to government. "If you’re stranded on a rooftop, you’re not waiting for ‘a thousand points of light’ as George H.W. Bush used to describe America’s network of private charities. You’re waiting for the Coast Guard or the police or the National Guard."

Well, EJ and David, people might be waiting for big government to save them and it might be morally obligated to do so but the "thousand points of light" rescued many times more people in New Orleans during Katrina than government did, especially big government. The armed forces, Coast Guard and the rest of the national government were helpful but only claimed to have rescued 8,500 people in the first few weeks. Yet, only 3,000 were federal troops and 30,000 were state National Guardsmen, who also were there much earlier. More important, first responders in general officially rescued 27,000 in New Orleans; that is, six times more people were rescued by non-military, non-Federal, mostly local personnel. Little St. Bernard Parish officials alone rescued 8,000. But most rescues reported by the media were made by private parties, rescuing people with their own boats and resources. Individuals, families, neighbors and local government are the conservative solution to social problems, including big ones like natural disasters, and reports suggest they were the ones who actually bore most of the burden.

The greatest part of the private effort was that the overwhelming majority of people went to their automobiles all by themselves and escaped any harm whatsoever. The local government did open the roads out in both directions on Saturday when Mayor Ray Nagin declared an emergency but only a relatively few were actually transported by government. While 30,000 or so people were sheltered in government facilities, many scores of thousands more were housed in churches and other private charitable facilities and, unlike reports from the Superdome, complaints were few. One church bus program in Jefferson Parish alone provided rides to safety for 23,000 people. The mayor of nearby Baton Rouge told reporters his city only had 350,000 residents but that there were an additional 350,000 New Orleans refugees staying with family, friends and even strangers there.

President George W. Bush declared a national disaster the day the hurricane hit the coast on Monday August 29, promised Federal help and cut short his vacation the following day. The Federal Emergency Management Agency set up headquarters in Washington even before the storm landed and began planning distribution of supplies and organizing outside assistance. Its parent Department of Homeland Security declared the storm an "incident of national significance" on Tuesday.

FEMA quickly inaugurated its planned security pass system to screen those allowed to enter the affected zone. But this immediately became a bar to outside assistance. Florida attempted to send 500 airboats that could not get clearance and even Bush housing secretary, Alphonso Jackson, complained at a cabinet meeting that his attempts to send emergency housing were thwarted by homeland security red tape. When trying to send a private helicopter to the scene, one congressman representing the area was told that FEMA was in charge, the FAA was in charge and the military was. A mayor in his district was put on hold for 45 minutes, security forces blocked scores of private rescue boats from docking on the river, and a sheriff was told to e-mail a request for help when he had no electricity.

It was not the storm, however, that led directly to the enormous destruction. New Orleans weathered the hit Monday until the protecting levees burst that evening. Why? The levees were designed to deal with a Category 3 hurricane but, when it landed, Katrina was a Category 4. The resulting disaster was the inevitable consequence of the planned defenses. No matter how good the maintenance efforts of the local levee boards or the rescue efforts, there would have been a disaster. Who decided on only Category 3 protection? Why big government, of course, in the form of presidential budgets, Congressional appropriations and Corps of Engineers plans. To blame President Bush was simply ignorant, however, for the crucial decisions on the levee system were made many years ago.

It is critical to understand why levees large enough to protect against a Category 4 hurricane were not built. The Corps most look at the entire U.S. seacoast and make decisions on objective needs -- and, inevitably in a democracy, on politics too. Even without politics, there is not enough money in the world to build against category fives -- which Katrina was just before landing--all along America’s thousands of miles of coastline. New Orleans is particularly vulnerable but there are many other locations in potential danger -- the largest previous disaster was Galveston and it is still vulnerable to big storms--and New Orleans did have Category 3 protection, which many other vulnerable locations do not. In allocating always limited resources, New Orleans did rather well when compared to other locations from a national perspective. What was missing was someone who was not looking at the whole nation but was concerned precisely and exclusively with the safety of New Orleans.

At one time the states were in charge of flood control for the Mississippi River. A severe storm in 1849 flooded New Orleans and led the national government to give its first financial support to state river control activities. In 1856 a riverboat hit the first bridge across the river at Davenport, Iowa and the national Corps of Engineers demanded and received control of all bridge building. Following another severe storm, a national Mississippi River Commission was created in 1879 that, with the Corps, was given control over the states to once-and-for-all bring the whole river system under federal control and stop the flooding. This is how the national government grows. Some local disaster occurs and the "solution" is for higher-level expertise to take over and solve the problem. Only, nature does not cooperate and storms keep coming despite the magic of big Federal government control.

After the federal takeover, there were severe floods in 1882, 1912, 1922, 1947, 1965, 1973 and 1993 --to say nothing of the biggest, in 1927, captured in John M. Barry’s classic, "Rising Tide," causing thousands of casualties and several hundred deaths. But regardless of the Feds record, power is never given back to the locals. Indeed, in the wake of Katrina, one panicked writer for The Wall Street Journal even suggested revisiting the Posse Comitatus Act of 1876 to put the military in charge, which had not been deemed necessary earlier even in the worst days of war or disaster. Actually, both Chief of Staff Andrew Card and the president did pressure Louisiana Gov. Kathleen Blanco to sign a document transferring control of her National Guard, which she fortunately refused. History proves there will be future severe storms that will cause great damage in any event but what sense does it make to take responsibility away from those who have the greatest incentive to take precautions and help neighbors, and that is the people locally who will suffer the most from being flooded?

It is interesting that Dionne was back in his paper four days later calling hurricane relief efforts inadequate and a "disastrous failure," saying that the president suffered "diminished standing" as a result. Bush actually spent slightly more on levees than his friend Clinton and much more on organizational expertise in the new homeland security agency. But big money and big government did not help. Another contributor to Dionne’s newspaper concluded the lesson was to give up and live with nature. Actually, the necessary relief efforts were rather good considering the size of the disaster and that the overwhelming percentage of people either avoided harm entirely or were rescued, fed and clothed. Blaming the locals or the governor is as silly as picking on the president. The problem was the levees and that people expected more. The public statements of the president, governor, mayor and the director of FEMA encouraged the idea that "we were in charge" and all would be all right.

Only big government was not in charge and can never be. In fact, local people must be first on the scene. Most of these performed rather well, many heroically, with the normal problems of bureaucracy necessarily present. They were supported by private resources of an incredible variety. The Red Cross sent thousands of volunteers to help and tens of millions of others were involved through financial contributions to it and thousands of other private “points of light.” Annheuser-Bush contributed 2.5 million cans of drinking water a week, Bristol-Meyers-Squib gave unlimited access to baby food, Eli Lilly sent 40,000 vitals of refrigerated insulin, Kellogg sent seven truckloads of crackers and cookies. General Electric gave trailers, modular space and medical equipment, Cendant donated rooms for emergency workers, Home Depot sent $500,000 for housing repair, Springs Industry sent sheets, blankets, and comforters. DTE Energy sent 100 trucks and 75 tree-trimmers, General Motors gave 150 vehicles to the Red Cross, Navistar arranged for its heavy trucks to go to the region, and 15 airlines donated thousands of trips to send victims to shelters in other cities. The list of private assistance is endless.

Where the private sector had full responsibility, things were even better. In testimony before the Senate Energy Committee when it returned after Labor Day, government and industry experts told the surprised politicians that the regional electricity grid, the natural gas and petroleum gas lines originating in the Gulf, and the local refining capabilities were already back to 80 percent of capacity and would reach 90 percent in a week or so. Meanwhile government-run water and sewage pipelines and levees in Louisiana and Mississippi were out indefinitely. The safest solution is probably a multi-state authority that re-routes the main flow of the Mississippi to the Atchafalaya, making Baton Rouge the central port, by-passing New Orleans’ population and retaining only a reserve spillway for the tourists. Yet, when Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert even questioned the viability of restoring a city below sea level, he was immediately forced to retreat before the media mob.

If government were a rational business, the lessons of Katrina would be obvious. Utilize most what worked best and has the greatest incentive to do the same in the future. Avoid centralized bureaucracy. Place most responsibility locally and regionally. Privatize every function possible. National resources can only be a back-up. Free private “thousand points of light.” Unfortunately, politics is not rational and the solution will be to throw Federal money at the problem with more red tape and more big government bureaucracy, guaranteeing a national view that cannot focus upon protecting any specific location from the future horrendous hurricane or flood that will soon hit somewhere else, just as one has done every few years since big government solved the problem in 1879.