Donald J. Devine

June 22, 2005

The Limits of Empire

It has been a heady few months, with relatively free elections in Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, Ukraine, Thailand, Indonesia and East Timor. Lebanon held open elections following the withdrawal of foreign Syrian troops after 30 years of occupation. Even Saudi Arabia held local elections and Egypt opened somewhat by holding a referendum on multiparty elections. Is President George W. Bush's second inaugural dream for democracy and freedom in the Middle East and the world now at hand?

America's most influential right-of-center editorial page is optimistic but warns there is much more to do. "The U.S. with its stake in Iraq and the Persian Gulf, its opposition to terrorist attacks, and its commitment to spreading democracy in the Mideast, cannot be indifferent to a nuclear Iran," says The Wall Street Journal. Even with recent elections in Iran, Ayatollah Ali-Hoseini Khamenei must be confronted militarily, if not "tomorrow," certainly soon, when diplomacy fails. Nor can the U.S. ignore Syria, nor Lebanon whose elections strengthened Hezbollah and its allies, nor Palestine where Hamas demonstrated new voting power, nor Libya, nor Kyrgyzstan, nor Uzbekistan, nor Pakistan, nor… The logic is merciless. Once troops are embedded in a region, they are vulnerable to nearby forces and must be protected. Bringing democracy to the whole world, means one "cannot" safely stop anywhere.

Does China get added to the list of empire responsibilities? Does all of East Asia with its seesaw ups and downs for democracy in Indonesia, the Philippians, and even Taiwan and Korea? Do they even require perhaps as much attention as the Middle East, as a Journal op-ed suggested? Does the fact the U.S has assisted these nations toward maturity create a further imperial obligation? And then there is George Will. While he has generally supported, U.S. military involvement, he conceded there is a further logic to the enterprise: "Empire is always about domination," and, "inevitably" some torture even if not condoned at the top.

Afghanistan has been the American nation-building showcase. No one to speak of opposed military action following the 9/11 attack to eliminate Osama bin Laden's refuge. The plan was to commit enough elite U.S. forces to assist the indigenous forces but not so many that it would be difficult to leave once the mission was won. Not only was the plan followed, unlike in Iraq, but it was accomplished quickly culminating in a successful election. Yet, significant problems remain even there. Violence has recently escalated dramatically, including the first suicide bombing of a mosque with scores killed, including the Baghdad police chief. Bowing to popular pressure, President Hamid Karzai came to Washington to demand that newly elected Afghan officials obtain greater control of American troops stationed there to limit the scope of house searches and interrogations. President Bush told him no.

Yet, how long can the U.S. refuse a democratically elected government's request to gain more control of foreign troops on its own soil, when it is preaching democracy to the world? One of the American complaints in its Declaration of Independence was that the unjust British king "affected to render the military independent of and superior to the civil power." Would American officials allow foreign soldiers to be unaccountable to U.S. officials while stationed on U.S. soil? With its extensive military commitments and expansive democratic vision for the world, however, America "cannot be indifferent" anywhere its troops are engaged, and must often say no to local officials, democratic or not. Bosnia is an extreme example where an international commissioner routinely overrules local elected officials but any military exposure necessarily places troop security first. The logic of empire requires a yes or no depending upon military exposure whatever other ideals are at stake. This is not intransigence but the logic that follows from the degree of force commitment, as the Journal editors correctly concluded and President Bush necessarily responded.

The question is, when the commitments are so large and the goals so sweeping, will logic crush reality? Of course, Afghan President Karzai wants U.S. financial aid and, immediately upon President Bush's refusal to make U.S. forces responsible to the locals, played it down. But how long can he get away with this at home, especially since neither he nor American troops control wide swaths of its outer regions. Iraq is at an interesting crossroads too. The rousing days of the historic election have given way to inter and intra group squabbling resulting in months of delay in selecting a government, which is still not complete. Meeting the August deadline for a constitution to be put before voters will be extremely difficult, especially one broadly acceptable to the relevant groups. President Bush himself recently placed an urgent call to local officials to speed things up.

In words disturbingly similar to Karzai's, the recently assassinated governor of the Sunni Anbar province, Raja Nawaf Farhan Mahalawi, complained just before his death about American military attacks on Iraqi homes even as he was assisting U.S. forces and demanding more efficient and targeted action. Members of his Abu Mahal clan took matters in their own hands and avenged the killing without Iraqi or American approval by executing four foreign Arabs the same day. Since the Iraq election, more than 800 people have been killed in accelerating violence, most of it by irregular forces related to multiple clans, tribes, ethnic groups and religious sects.

As your editor reported upon his return from Iraq in late 2003, while difficult to accomplish, it is conceivable that the Shiite, Kurd and Sunni peoples could each create a workable and somewhat representative government for themselves. It is only the thought of putting them together into a single government that makes the prospects daunting. The Shiites are a majority and even the moderates among them demand majority rule--but that translates into rule by them and their own brand of Islam. They have been wise to create a coalition with the Kurds in the legislature due to their slim majority following the election, which was boycotted by the Sunnis. The key, however, is the constitution and whether Shiites will agree to autonomy for Kurds and Sunnis. This is more likely for the Kurds, who are already de facto independent and well armed in intact units. On the other hand, it was recently revealed that Kurds have been shipping Arabs out of the strategic city of Kirkuk to assure their own advantage there during the following election.

The Sunnis are the sticking point. They are seen by the Shiites as heretical theologically and oppressors historically, very much including under Saddam Hussein. Both Shiites and Sunni would prefer a law based on Islamic Shari'a but each one reads it differently and would fight to the death not to be ruled by the other's interpretation. All of the leading Shia political parties are committed to rooting out Saddam era officials, who are overwhelmingly Sunni. It took a personal visit by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to cool down the idea for a while, since American forces have relied extensively on them to build the new Iraqi army. But the issue returned just after the visit and is high on the new government's agenda. It is difficult to see how American forces can pressure this determined elected government in this way over the long haul.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, like her predecessor, has likewise demanded that the new government be federal to allow each community to work out its own destiny. But the long-term prospects are dubious. When the earlier U.S. provisional government created a basic law to serve as an interim constitution, the country's leading Shiite, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sustani, insisted that the federalism sections not appear in the United Nations resolution supporting the election -- and they did not. Deep clan and religious loyalties, sectarian revenge codes and one imposed Shari'a law nationally make for a volatile mix stronger than lectures on democracy. While U.S. military planners are looking for consolidation of U.S. troops in enclaves in 2006, or even withdrawal, the much less complex Afghan situation proves how difficult that will be.

While one must cheer the good news, the real problems even in Afghanistan and Iraq remain, to say nothing about devoting American treasure and forces to bringing democracy and peace to the rest of the world. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, while broadly supporting the president's goals, bluntly addressed the limits to them. "No single nation is strong enough or wise enough to involve itself in every political evolution around the world simultaneously. Priorities based on the national interest are imperative. Otherwise, psychological exhaustion and physical overextension are a real possibility, along with a global coalition of the resentful and nationalistic resisting perceived American hegemony. President Bush has put forward a dramatic vision. The national debate now needs to focus upon the concrete circumstances to which it must be applied."